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VALUES IN LAND USE CONTROLS: SOME PROBLEMS*
Robert Kramer**
CAN we develop a general theory which will give us at least some
rational guidance concerning the nature and extent of government plan-
ning and controls for land use-a theory which will indicate how we can
determine in particular situations whether planning and controls by gov-
ernment are desirable?1
Any such theory must be based upon the assumption that planning is
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possible as well as desirable. When we say that government planning is
possible, we make certain assumptions, including the following:
First, we assume that government action can and will affect human
uses of land, and change physical and perhaps even social environment.
If government action is powerless, planning and controls will be useless
and a waste of time and energy.
Second, we assume that it is possible to predict with a reasonable degree
of accuracy in a given situation both what will happen if the government
does not act and what will result if the government does plan and impose
certain controls. Lacking such predictive ability, planning becomes irra-
tional, if not dangerous-a wild guess about the future.
Third, we assume that suitable legal, political, social and physical tech-
niques either exist or can be devised to carry out the plans and controls
whose desirable effects we are able to predict if they are adopted.
Thus, in considering the desirability of land planning by the govern-
ment we must go beyond descriptive studies and analyses of past and
present conditions. We must have available the power to make the
required predictions as to what will happen in the future should the
controls be adopted or not, and the techniques to carry out such controls.
We must bear in mind that usually land controls are desired to change
the social as well as the physical environment; indeed frequently, the
social aspects of planning are the ultimate goal rather than the changes
of the physical environment. We desire decent housing because we
assume that such physically attractive shelter will have important social
consequences such as decreases in crime and juvenile delinquency. This
assumes, however, that our planning and controls can have predictable
social as well as physical consequences-that is, that there is a definite
relationship or correlation between bad housing and a high crime rate,
and that improvement of housing will decrease crime. Frequently such
assumptions of a predictable relationship between physical environment
and social goods and evils may be based on guesses rather than demon-
strated proof. Eradication of a slum may simply transfer the criminals
and delinquents to other areas of the community when their former slum
housing is torn down.
Furthermore, strictly speaking, the issue in planning is not whether or
not the government will do something or will act. The government will
always act, even if its action is to give the ultimate sanctions to the private
plans and uses of individual landowners instead of attempting to regulate
such individual uses. The real question is not if the government will act
but how, and by what methods and procedures, and to what extent will
government sanction private uses of land in lieu of attempting to change
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them or direct them into other channels than those preferred by the indi-
vidual users.
In planning, the desirable is always limited by the possible. Perhaps
too frequently we assume that if certain planning and controls are desir-
able, then this conclusion alone should persuade us to proceed, apparently
upon the basis that a way must and will be found to make them possible.
We ignore or gloss over our inability to predict accurately the results of
using or not using the controls, our lack of techniques to carry out the
controls and our questionable assumption of a proved relationship between
the objectionable social conditions to be eradicated and the physical en-
vironment we intend to alter. The fact is, no control or plan is ultimately
desirable if it is not possible. To attempt the impossible in the field of
planning is to invite disaster in the form of tragic social and physical
consequences.
It may well be, as Michael Polanyi has attempted to demonstrate
mathematically,' that wide scale economic planning by the state is impos-
sible because of the intellectual and physical limitations of human beings.
This is especially true if the state tries to take account of what people
need and want, instead of simply dictating what shall be done. Perhaps,
as Polanyi attempts to prove, individual humans, no matter how powerful
and gifted physically and mentally, simply cannot consciously control and
plan on a sweeping scale the manifold economic activities of modem
society which today are performed by what we call the market mecha-
nism, however imperfect the market may be. I suspect that Polanyi's
conclusions may be too sweeping, and that some such modification as that
suggested by Fuller is required. Fuller8 has pointed out that much of our
social order comes, not from a planned series of acts, but rather innumer-
able individual unplanned acts which all together amount to organization
by reciprocity, the outstanding examples of which are the market and
scientific research. The basis of such reciprocity is exchange and bar-
gaining-A and B each exchange goods or services and thereby obtain a
gain from each other. Such individual reciprocal adjustments cannot, on
a wide scale, be planned by government. On the other hand, organization
by common ends-where A and B combine to achieve what neither alone
can do-is a possible subject for state planning and control; for here men
can work together and plan. The essential factor here is the need for
common goals or ends-absent these, successful planning is impossible.
It seems to me that much land planning may be possible since it falls
within Fuller's classification of organization for common ends-schools,
2 M. Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders (1951).
S Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1955).
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roads, sewers, and water supplies, for example. More difficult, however, is
the question of how far planning is possible because of lack of agreement
concerning common ends. It may be argued that there can be no agree-
ment on common goals in planning unless the goals are expressed so vaguely
as to be meaningless or highly ambiguous; or unless a dictator or demagogue
compels or deceives people into assenting to his goals. However true this
may be, certainly I think that even the most ardent advocates of plan-
ning are beginning to realize that no plan is really possible of successful
operation as hoped for by the planners unless there is widespread public
acceptance of the goals of the plan. How to achieve such acceptance-by
education, by propaganda, by selling or advertising campaigns, by other
means of persuasion-is another question. The extent to which there
can be true voluntary agreement upon meaningful common goals in plans
is yet to be seen. Quite possibly, planning which tolerates the widest
possible scope for individual action may induce more general acceptance
than planning which leaves less room for individual choice.
There are other limits on "the possible" in planning, arising out of the
political and administrative processes of government itself.4 We must
realize that there is a reaction of the regulated upon the regulator-those
subject to controls do not remain passive, but instead strive, often suc-
cessfully, to convert the planner to a different point of view. Moreover,
planners to some degree tend to become biased in favor of more plan-
ning; if controls or regulations do not work as predicted, the remedy of
the planner is usually not decontrol but instead newer and more wide-
spread controls. In addition, in land use control, as in other forms of
government regulation, there frequently is the inherent difficulty that the
planners are actually making managerial decisions-decisions concerning
pricing and capital outlays and market conditions-without, however,
having the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of such de-
cisions. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that normally land use
is not a static condition. Instead, it is a dynamic swiftly changing func-
tion in a continuously evolving social structure, which requires constant
innovation and invention, with boldness and imagination. Yet, by its
very nature, planning must at some point be static, must assume a frozen
structure; else all planning becomes impossible-the plans are outmoded
before they are finally drafted. Thus, it is often necessary for planners,
by zoning or otherwise, to freeze the status quo for a given period while
formulating plans, then to remove the freeze, but later to call another
halt to attempt to consolidate and appraise new developments. It takes
4 Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105 (1954); Jaffe, Book Review, 65 Yale L. J. 1068 (1956).
[Vol. 7
VALUES IN LAND USE CONTROLS
time to foresee trends and to evolve plans to cope with them, but by then
new factors make obsolete the solutions. Moreover, planning in this
country is not possible without certain procedural safeguards-due proc-
ess and other requirements of fair play. Yet, the inevitable effect of such
requirements is to slow up the planning process, to make it slower to act
or to adjust to rapid changes. There also may be limits to government
planning imposed by personnel problems. On the one hand, the more
contented people become, perhaps because of planning, the more reluc-
tant they are apt to be to pay for the planning by taxes to meet agency
budgets. On the other hand, private industry often is successful in hiring
away from government the more successful planners, leaving for govern-
ment planning the less bold, less energetic, less competent personnel.
Finally, the severe territorial limits imposed on land use planning in this
country must also be taken into account.
Assuming certain planning and controls for land use are possible, as
above indicated, what other factors must be considered to determine
their desirability? Obviously to answer this- question, we must ask what
are the goals of land use; what values or objectives or satisfactions does
our society wish to obtain from the use of land? Given these goals or
values, we can then attempt to decide in a given case whether planning
and controls will aid or hinder their achievement. This question, of
course, assumes that we can reach common agreement on meaningful
values here-a large assumption as pointed out above. There are many
possible values here, which can be grouped in a large number of ways.
The arrangement I have set forth below is simply one I find convenient.
The order in which I have listed various values in no way reflects their
importance or weight-that is another matter I shall return to later.
1. The promotion of the maximum productivity in the use of land.
There is a social need to obtain the most possible goods out of our raw
resources, such as land. In the case of non-urban land this means the
obtaining of natural wealth for society from land in the form of crops,
livestock, timber, furs, oils and minerals, and other agricultural and
natural resource products. For urban land, this would include various
industrial and commercial uses; even residential urban property in a
sense is being used to shelter those who are engaged in productive work
for society. By encouraging the highest productivity in land use we in-
crease society's total material wealth and make possible a higher standard
of living. Of course maximum productivity may conflict with other
values such as conservation of forests, minerals, coal, oil and other
natural resources, or cause farm surpluses, soil erosion, and depletion,
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or overcrowding in cities. Generally speaking, however, there is an
essential value to society in obtaining the maximum economic productiv-
ity from land use.
2. A just and fair distribution in land use. The difficulty with this
value is in defining what is justice and fairness in the distribution of land.
There are several possible approaches. One insists on absolute equality,
so far as possible in land ownership and use. This might be achieved by
dividing up the land equally among all families or individuals so that
each would have the same amount to use; or it might be achieved by
abolishing entirely all private rights in land and having it used collec-
tively by large groups. A second approach is to reduce or eliminate large
scale inequalities in land use among individuals, either by limiting the
maximum amount any one person may have, or guaranteeing to each
person a certain minimum amount of land, or some combination of both.
Such a system tolerates, within limits, a certain amount of inequality in
land distribution and use. A third view applies the principle of equality
by guaranteeing to each equal opportunity and equal treatment, so far as
possible, in acquiring land, but places no restriction on the amount of
land which may be acquired. This approach-to make all equally free-
bans social, religious, or other unfair discriminations in the distribution
or use of land. Ordinarily, however, it makes no attempt to ban economic
discrimination or inequalities imposed by the free market (except for
monopolistic trends)-the fact that he who has inherited or acquired
capital has an advantage in the land market over those lacking such
capital. Frequently, there are conflicts between what we may regard as
the fairest distribution of land and its most productive use; the large
size farm may be more productive than the family size holding.
3. Human health, mental and physical, and safety. This recognizes
human needs for light, fresh air, quiet, open spaces, adequate water and
sewer systems, traffic controls, smog and pollution protection and insect
controls. Here again this value may directly conflict with the most
productive use of land; highly productive factories may pollute water
and air.
4. Beauty. There is a value in land which is pleasant and beautiful,
the most attractive uses of land and scenery. Unfortunately, this value
is highly subjective, constantly changing both in society and in individuals.
5. Morality. We wish to reduce crime and juvenile delinquency; to
combat such moral evils as drunkenness, prostitution, and excessive
gambling. Unfortunately, we frequently find a vast gap between publicly
professed standards and actual human practices-a "small" amount is
unofficially tolerated when not too patent in operation.
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6. Security. There are several aspects or levels of security. One is
security of the nation-national defense. Another is family and individ-
ual security-giving each family or person an adequate home as "his
castle." This of course involves the even larger issue of economic or
social security for each individual.
7. An adequate family life. This may, in extreme forms, relate to the
size of the family-to foster smaller or larger populations. It may more
often involve the fostering of what are believed to be desirable family re-
lationships through emphasis on the home as the place where the family
grows, lives, and plays together.
8. The development of a desirable system of government. Whatever
form of government we may believe most desirable, the use of land may
contribute to the growth, stability, and preservation of such government.
The existing distribution of land may contribute either to revolution or
social unrest or result in peace, order, and stability. If we wish maximum
individual participation of individuals in government, land use again may
promote this goal.
9. Justice and fairness. Land use and distribution may or may not be
in accord with community ideas as to what is just and fair, either as to
the procedures followed in, or the actual results of, the distribution and
use.
10. Development of character. The difficulty with this value is its
vagueness: what are desirable traits of character in individuals; to what
extent are certain human traits natural born instincts which must be
accepted whether we like them or not? We wish to foster generosity,
tolerance, altruism and respect for points of view of others. We desire
individuals to be independent, self-reliant, able to act, think, plan and
take care of themselves and their families. We want men able to get
along with others, and yet capable of independent thought and action.
We desire men with both self-respect and self-control-responsible
human beings, aware of the dignity of all men.
11. Freedom and Liberty. To most of us these are among the very
fundamental values of society. We want both freedom from restraints
and freedom to do things-freedom to act, to think, to speak, to write,
to vote-all of our civil and political liberties. In addition, there is the
value of the creative, purposive, choosing side of human nature, respon-
sible for so many of man's great achievements, the result of freedom to
try, to experiment, to fail or succeed, to diverge from the ways of the
community, to challenge its most basic assumptions and beliefs. There
is value in the human need for self-expression, for each to develop his
personality in his own way to the fullest extent possible. This value often
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conflicts with others. Humans may prefer only to associate with others
of their own race, culture, or social or economic class, and so may make
social and other discriminations contrary to equality of treatment and a
fair and just distribution of land use. Divergence may result in ugliness
rather than beauty or in non-productivity of land.
12. Happiness and well being. Perhaps this is only the sum total of
all or some of the preceding values. It is so intensely subjective that it is
hard to describe or give definite content.
These dozen or so general values recognize that land and its use are
both an integral part of society's economic organization and a vital co-
ordinating factor in the functioning of our entire social order.
More important, and certainly more difficult than a mere catalogue
of desirable values, is the question of how do we determine in a given
situation whether planning and controls will aid or hinder the achieve-
ment of these values? In part, this is a function of specialized social
sciences. The economist must give us guidance as to whether controls
will increase productivity; the political scientist must assess their effect
upon government; the criminologist their effect upon crime and morality.
There are, however, several essential general issues here which merit
further discussion.
First, to what extent should results be reached by a mere counting of
noses-a determination of whether more people will suffer from controls
than from the lack of them or a decision based upon how many people
favor or oppose the controls? Should we give greater weight to the wishes
or values of any particular group of people-the rich, the poor, tenants,
landlords, the aged, the workers? Would not any such preferential treat-
ment amount to unequal treatment and unfair discrimination? Should
only those directly affected by controls have any voice? Under our form
of government it would seem that equal weight must be given to the
values and wishes of at least all people in any way involved.
What about these various values, however? Should all be given equal
weight, or should some be preferred or subordinated? Should we attempt
to discover a hierarchy of values? Is there any way we can determine
the amount of satisfaction each value gives each person, or is this far too
subjective a matter? Apart from some mechanism such as a free market,
I believe it impossible to attempt any such scaling of values-all must
be given equal weight.
Are we then reduced simply to the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber-majority rule here? Yet, many of our values depend upon protec-
tion of or tolerance for minorities-freedom, character, fairness and
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justice, proper distribution. Certainly we must always permit the minor-
ity a fair chance to state its case and be heard-we should take every
precaution to be certain that its wishes are not overlooked. Furthermore,
in many instances it may well be that if the minority is willing to pay the
full cost of what it wishes, there will be no social harms or costs if its
wishes are granted, assuming they are not criminal or immoral.
Another issue of importance here is whether we should approach the
valuation of controls impartially or with a bias for or against their use.
Should we take the position that controls are the exception in the kind
of society we prefer, and should not be imposed except where there is a
convincing case made out for their use because of serious infringement of
desirable social values? Or should we proceed upon the assumption that
uncontrolled land use is the exception and only justified upon a clear
showing that it will not seriously jeopardize desirable social values? Or,
should we approach the issue with no presuppositions one way or
the other? I confess my own preference for the approach which places
the burden of proof, so to speak, upon those who would impose controls.
I base this choice upon my feeling that as a general rule more of the
basic values are promoted by a free market than by widespread controls.
Thus, a free market encourages the most productive use of land by
stimulating the maximum development of it in order to obtain the profits
given by the market. It promotes growth of character by letting in-
dividuals decide for themselves how to use their land and holding them
responsible for the results. This is not to deny that controls may not be
needed to secure certain values at certain times. In fact, controls may
be essential to preserve the proper functioning of the market if private
groups such as bankers, credit or insurance agencies, real estate brokers,
begin to exercise monopoly powers. The demands of health, safety,
security, fairness in distribution, all may require some controls on land
use. But, I believe in the principle of strategic controls: the least possi-
ble we can get along with which will do the job of meeting our really
urgent needs. In general, it means to me that the free market is the best
way to allocate our use of land resources and the price of such resources
-the allocation of such resources both as to what is produced and who
shall use it. Generally, market price is a better assessment of these
various values than any other mechanism we have.
In particular, it seems to me, the values of freedom and liberty may
be imperiled by land use controls. For one thing, such controls create
restraints almost inevitably on individual action; true, such restraints
may produce other values or enlarge the freedom of others, but of neces-
sity they do limit the freedom of some in the use of their land. Second,
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such controls are apt to create a social and political organism hostile to
freedom and liberty. Most of us, even if we acknowledge the need for
powerful government, view with some misgivings such a development,
fearing the impact of such power upon individual freedoms, minority
rights, individual divergencies and eccentricities. This is not to argue that
freedom can exist without government-it cannot. We need a social and
political structure in order to permit us to make meaningful choices
which are the true basis of freedom. But, it does seem to me that the
essence of freedom is the meaningful choice-the choice the individual
makes directly for himself in a concrete situation: such choices, I believe,
are typically the ones each of us makes in a free market; they are not
the type we are apt to make when government planning and controls
dominate our lives.
Actually, I believe that freedom and productivity and the other values
I have listed are perhaps far more consistent with planning and controls
in the case of land use than in the case of other factors in society such as
labor. The explanation, I suspect, is perhaps partly because some of the
controls may be ones which mainly perfect the workings of the free
market by curbing monopolistic trends, and partly and more importantly,
because of a second factor. This factor is the presence in the land use
field of so many values on which we usually do not attempt to put a
market price-character, morality, security and beauty. Because we
have here so many noneconomic and nonmonetary values we may have
more controls without harmful effect on a free market. This is not to say
that such values as beauty, health or security are not priced on the
market (they are when necessity requires) for we assume almost every
piece of land has its price regardless of its subjective value to the user.
What we do recognize, however, is that the translation of many of these
values into monetary terms by the market is at best crude and often
inadequate. Another approach to this thesis is to stress that in land use
we frequently have a problem of large social costs to others of land uses
which the users customarily, in a free market, will not bear or include in
their market prices. Controls are then simply a method to redistribute
the burden of such social costs as pollution, smog, noise, soil erosion and
depletion, to the user or the purchasers of his products. Also, frequently
land use may involve social benefits so widely diffused that no private
user can obtain sufficient return in the market to warrant undertaking
them. Such things as public works or parks or schools may fall into this
class.
Another factor influencing a more favorable attitude toward land use
controls may be the fact that eminent domain often is present. It would
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seem to me that the use of eminent domain in land planning and controls
is a vital factor, for at the very least it softens the impact of the controls
to a considerable degree, and often entirely or largely removes the dam-
aging effect of controls on certain of our values. If the exercise of con-
trols damages certain values which are desirable to me and society, at
least, eminent domain gives me a sum of money which in a free market
may enable me to purchase an equivalent value or satisfaction for what
I have lost because of controls. Of course, this is true only if the values
I have lost can be purchased in a free market. The market may not offer
the equivalent of such values to me. Or, if planning and controls have
gone far enough, there may be no free market left for me to buy in.
Land use, in this country, is usually subject to quite definite territorial
limitation-the city, county, or state. This may, of course, put definite
limits on the scope of planning; but such limits may actually permit,
subject to their limitation, more effective planning than if attempts were
to be made on a larger scale. It may well be easier to plan land use for a
small area than for a whole country, even granting that the smallness of
the area subject to planning may seriously limit the possibilities of the
planning.
May land use planning be more effective or at least easier to control
because land uses are less dynamic than other elements of our economy,
such as automobiles? We can trade in our old car for a new model each
year, but few of us change our housing so quickly. In a relatively short
period of time-a decade or two-it is possible to scrap all old or obsolete
cars and start afresh; but the problem of how to replace obsolete housing,
to remodel cities, is not so easy of solution. On balance, it seems to me
that this factor in land use does not make planning here any simpler or
more acceptable. For one thing, the rate of change in land use planning
actually may be as rapid as in other areas; after all, the changes in auto-
mobile design and use are a big factor in urban and even rural land use.
For another thing, while the more permanent and stable nature of land
use may give planners more time for thought and make land even more
tolerant of controls, this very stability and permanence creates other
more serious problems for planners, not the least of which, perhaps, is
that a mistake in land planning often cannot be corrected-a misplaced
subdivision is there to stay for a good many years. Moreover, the users
of land may be more, rather than less, opposed to controls for the very
reason that land is often a long-term investment for them.
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